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PERCEIVING THE ENEMY DIFFERENTLY: A PSYCHO-CULTURAL ANALYSIS 




By using an interdisciplinary approach, this article seeks to examine Pakistan-India partition 
and their ongoing rivalry which is a permanent threat to South Asian regional security. This 
article analyses Pakistan-India conflict through a fresh psycho-cultural framework to explain 
both states’ endless competitive urge to outpace each other. I will describe the attributes of the 
indigenous ‘culture of conflict’ in both countries and use them as an ‘analogy’. This article 
develops a conflict theory to explain the rationale behind such an emotion-laden rivalry 
between two nations. The conflict theory presented in this article (which can be termed as 
Sharike-Bazi Culture of Conflict) explains that peoples’ conflict behaviours in Pakistan (and 
India) are rooted in their earliest socialization within primary kinship institutions.  
 
In Pakistan (and India), the indigenous ‘culture of conflict’ emanates from the segmentation of 
the most pervasive and influential institutions; the kinship institutions. The moralities of 
conflict behaviour learned within these institutions are extrapolated to every other institution 
in the outside world. Therefore, psychologically, the indigenous ‘culture of conflict’ creates 
certain moral views effecting the conflict behaviour of people as well as policy makers. It 
provides them with cultural moralities to pursue this zero-sum interstate conflict. 
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Introduction 
The India-Pakistan conflict is said to be simultaneously over territory, national identity, and 
power position in the region (Paul, 2005, pp. 3-8). The obsession with India is a key factor in 
determining Pakistan’s foreign and domestic policies, which ‘start’ and ‘end’ at Indian borders 
(Cohen, 2013). India and Pakistan have been locked in an open hostility since their inception. 
They have fought three conventional wars and several armed conflicts, such as Kargil. They 
regularly display their nuclear capability to outpace each other, which is always a question 
mark on South Asian/Asian security.  
A large number of nation-states came into being as a result of intergroup conflicts on political, 
ideological, religious, territorial, or ethnic grounds, but many of them have resolved their 
mutual conflicts or at least managed them to move forward (Bar-Tal, 2013, pp. 1-8). However, 
India and Pakistan have been psychologically obsessed with their conflicts since their partition 
in 1947. It can be explained, in part, as a result of conflicting versions of partition history taught 
in both countries to demonize the other (Aziz, 1993; Gautier, 1996). But people-to-people 
limited interaction after partition can also be regarded as an additional factor for their 
continuing obsession with each other. India-Pakistan conflict seems to possess minimum 
material value when compared to the huge emotional energies invested by both nations. From 
a Pakistani perspective, this paper seeks to examine the reasons behind both nations’ obsession 
with each other which do not let them forget past events. 
Numerous theories have tried to explain the causal factors for the ongoing rivalry between 
Pakistan and India. Realism and neo-Realism focus on ‘fear’ factor for Pakistan’s pursuance 
of ‘power’ for its survival (Rizvi, 1993, pp. 1-17). The rational models present logical reason 
that a powerful and hostile neighbour can compel a (weak) state like Pakistan to attain the 
capacity for defence. However, I argue, that such explanations are inadequate to explain India-
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Pakistan conflict dynamics to its entirety. They can’t explain a firm Pakistani ‘faith’ that they 
can defeat a country ten times larger than their own. My conjecture is that such extra-aggressive 
and “irrational” conflict behaviour should also be analysed from a psychological perspective. 
In contrast to existing academic literature which holds an international system of anarchy and 
material interests responsible for Pakistan-India rivalry, this article examines the existing 
landscape of conflict from a different psycho-cultural framework to understand Pakistan’s 
behaviour in its conflict dynamics with India. This paper examines Pakistan-India conflict by 
using the attributes of their indigenous ‘culture of conflict’, which emanates from the 
segmentation of the most pervasive kinship institutions of ‘joint family’ and ‘lineage’ in both 
countries. Despite emphasizing much upon the role of ‘institutions’, the political analysts have 
often ignored the most initial, most salient, most emotionally powerful, and the most functional 
“kinship institutions” in both countries while examining their conflict. 
This inquiry will examine how people’s cultural behaviour of conflict dealing effects their 
behaviour in a national domain and impacts on the macro institutions of the state. As people in 
the subcontinent tend to transpose the psychological moral structure of their kinship institutions 
to every other institution in the outside world (Kakar and Kakar, 2009, Lyon, 2004, Lieven, 
2012); therefore, the conflict behaviour learned within these kinship institutions is also 
extrapolated to the other larger socio-political institutions. This article proposes that the 
Pakistan-India conflict is a mirror image of their indigenous ‘cultures of conflict’ in the 
subcontinent. The indigenous ‘culture of conflict’, which can be termed as “Sharike-Bazi” 
explains the conflict dynamics of intimate rivalries between kin groups (patrilineal cousins). 
Such a rivalry is always aimed at competing and defeating the other party even at the cost of 
one’s own destruction; a basic element of Pakistan-India rivalry.  
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This article explains how Pakistan-India rivalry became so intense and emotionally driven, by 
analysing the cultural underpinnings of their psychological obsession with each other. This 
article will analyse peoples’ indigenous conflict behaviour (especially from the Pakistani side) 
and its presence in interstate relations. I argue that both nations’ obsession with each other 
appears to owe more to their cultural sameness than their differences. Their historical, 
geographical, racial and cultural ties do not allow them to ignore each other (Buzan, 1991, p. 
78). This article, therefore, presents a fresh psycho-cultural perspective to understand the 
motivation behind the competitive urge that drives the Pakistani public, leaders, and army 
officers to defy India’s obvious numeric, economic and military supremacy, and to do so with 
such intensity. 
The psycho-cultural approach builds its theoretical framework on the notion that the earliest 
socialization of people within primary kinship institutions is central in developing their 
worldviews. This approach seeks to establish a causal link between peoples’ behaviour to that 
of the broader national behaviour. It explains people and their society through a dynamic 
analysis of the formation of their personalities within the cultural milieu (Stoddart & Hession, 
1951). It recognizes both emotional and behavioural conditioning and seeks to relate these 
acquired tendencies to the patterns of people’s behaviour as an adult in his family, community, 
social, economic, and political life. 
The rationale behind explaining Pakistan-India rivalry through the psycho-dynamics of 
‘indigenous culture of conflict’ lies in the argument that it emanates from the segmentation of 
kinship institutions; the most emotional, pervasive and authoritative ‘institutions’ for people in 
both Pakistan and India (Lyon, 2004, Lieven, 2012, Kakar and Kakar, 2009). Secondly, there 
exists a cultural and psychological proximity between both nations for sharing a syncretized 
society for centuries in the past. Despite having enormous ethnic diversity and religious 
differences, people in the  subcontinent not only share a cultural gene pool and identical kinship 
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structures (Kakar, 2006), but also similar conflict behaviour. This article also examines how 
both nations, despite being culturally so similar, are engaged in such an emotionally charged 
rivalry.  
Why not Existing Theoretical Models?  
There is dearth of scholarly literature explaining the logical reasons behind the psychosis of 
‘hatred’ and competition between Pakistan and India. On the face of it, there are two 
contradictory schools of thought explaining the reasons for this hostility: one finds faults with 
Pakistan’s revisionist, expansionist and greedy agenda for spreading its territorial and 
ideological expansionism (Fair, 2014, Ganguly, 2016). The other school holds Indian 
hegemonic designs responsible for Pakistan’s security seeking behaviour (Razvi, 1982, 
Ahmed, 2013). It is also argued by scholars that Pakistan is a ‘Garrison’ (Siddiqa, 2007), and 
‘warrior’ state (Paul, 2014). These scholars are in intellectual agreement that military regimes 
in Pakistan pursue their own institutional interests and regard permanent enmity with India as 
raison d'etre for their existence. 
Fair (2014) has aptly remarked that Pakistan will keep on competing with India even at the cost 
of its own destruction. Pakistani military’s paranoia with gaining recognition as equal to India 
is unending despite a widening gap between their national capabilities. Pakistan’s military 
rejects Indian regional ascendency “by seeing victory as the ability to continue fighting’ to the 
end” (p.7). 
I argue that Pakistan’s ambitious behaviour towards India can also be explained as an outcome 
of interactive process between masses and political elite. Regardless of civil or military 
regimes, since day one Pakistan has always pursued policies that must be diametrically 
opposite to Indian policies. The increasing role of military in state’s politics can also be 
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explained by the popular ‘desire’ for competing/defeating India at any cost, which can be 
regarded as one of the driving forces behind Pakistan’s adventurous policies.   
Furthermore, the military can be blamed for thwarting peace efforts attempted by Pakistani 
politicians. However, the army’s claim over territorial/ideological guardianship of the state is 
supported by a public majority for being the only “powerful” institution that can compete with 
India. Both political and military elite play upon popular sentiments against India to earn 
legitimacy. In fact, it is politicians not men-in-uniform, who gain more by anti-Indian rhetoric 
(Faruqi, 2000). This paper examines the cultural foundations of such combative behaviour 
towards India.  
India-Pakistan partition and conflict have mostly been analysed by theological cum ideological 
models which assume ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’ as fixed – rather opposing political categories. A 
school of thought says that both communities always had distinct identities, having dissimilar 
religion and cultures (Robinson, 1974; Savarkar, 1969; Sayeed, 1960). Indeed, the 
‘instrumental’ role of religion cannot be denied (Brass, 1974) while explaining India-Pakistan 
rivalry and can be termed as the most powerful divider between the two nations. Even the 
Pakistani nuclear bomb was dubbed as “Islamic bomb” against a “Hindu bomb” (Bhutto, 1969, 
p. 151). But, the need of this “Islamic” bomb was felt against the widening gap between 
Pakistan-India military capabilities, especially after the separation of the eastern arm (now 
Bangladesh) purely on ethno-linguistic and political grounds. Interestingly, ‘Hindu’ India 
helped the cause of ‘Muslim’ Bengalis against their own west Pakistani Muslim brethren 
(Malik, 1993).  
I argue that the religion, undoubtedly, was/is an important vehicle by which antipathies 
were/are constructed between both groups, but it must not be regarded as the only factor behind 
the creation of Pakistan and ongoing hostility between both nations. The subcontinent has 
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always been a multi-religious region, which has always absorbed people from different faiths 
according to its indigenous principles of caste and cultural hierarchy. Moreover, both religions 
are severely fragmented along caste and sectarian lines in the subcontinent. The “religion” 
focus also raises serious questions as to why leading religious parties had opposed the idea of 
‘Muslim’ Pakistan presented by Jinnah (Talbot, 2003; Syed, 1982, p. 35).   
The above interpretation is opposed by another school of thought which draws a symbiotic 
picture of Hindu-Muslim syncretic culture and religious harmony in pre-colonial and early 
colonial period. They blame the British, who made communalism grow between both sister-
communities to pursue their colonist agenda (Pandey, 1990). I argue that mentioning the 
syncretic part of culture only, is also incomplete. This version presents an ideal melting pot 
model for distinct cultural identities. In fact, South Asia has been a salad bowl of cultures, not 
a melting pot (Nandy, Trivedy, Mayaram & Yagnik, 1995). In a salad, the different ingredients 
retain their distinctiveness as different religious groups managed to do so for centuries in the 
subcontinent  
This article argues that despite having religious and ethnic differences, people in the 
subcontinent possess similar conflict behaviour due to their identical kinship structures. Both 
states had to adopt different ideologies otherwise the reason to part ways could not be justified. 
Pakistan had no option other than to move along religion’s trajectory, because religion was the 
dissimilar element between two communities that were otherwise more or less homogenous. 
In fact, Pakistan could opt for a secular path, had India adopted ‘Hinduism’ as its starting track. 
It implies that from the Pakistani perspective, the focal point is not ‘religion’, but the ‘desire’ 
of people to prove the ‘other’ as ‘different’ and  ‘wrong’.  
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Methodology and Organizing Schema 
Primarily, this paper uses a method of analogy-making; analogies are used to relate known to 
unknown experiences, to uncover other similarities once some basic resemblances are noted 
(O’Conner, 1971). Analogy is a form of scientific method that uses one set of behaviour to 
analyse and explain the behaviour of other phenomena (Morlidge & Player, 2010, p. 287). This 
methodology will help me to compare Pakistani family level conflict behaviour to that of 
Pakistani national behaviour against India. The analogy-method follows Aristotle’s saying that 
‘to be a master of metaphor is a sign of “genius”, since a good metaphor implies an eye for 
resemblance’ (Lancaster, 2015). I will also use discourse analysis method to analyse the 
primary and secondary data, providing empirical evidence to evaluate the main hypothesis that 
if and how this analogous model is relevant to understand Pakistan-India conflict.  
The first section explains the psycho-cultural approach in general, and, psycho-cultural 
interpretive theory of conflict (Ross, 1995); a fusion of psycho-analytic and psycho-social 
theories. The second section uses ethnographic data to explain the indigenous culture of 
conflict model “Sharike-Bazi” in Pakistan (and India). The secondary data has also been 
provided to substantiate the applicability of this model as analogy for Pakistan-India conflict. 
By using discourse analysis as a method, the third section explores the psycho-genesis of the 
India-Pakistan conflict and presents it as a mirror image of their traditional cultures of conflict. 
The fourth section situates conflict theory developed in this paper along with mainstream 
interstate theories i.e., realism and constructivism. The final section concludes how psychosis 
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Theoretical Approach: Defining Units of Analysis 
The institutional role of government, army and religion has been much analysed by theorists 
when explaining Pakistan-India conflict, however, the most enduring and influential 
institutions in this region have been grossly ignored. Despite enormous ethnic and religious 
diversity, South Asian people share common kinship institutions: the extended family group 
joined by marriage, which is called Khandan in Pakistan and Pariwar in India; or, the lineage 
group with common descendants, known as Biradari in Pakistan and Jati in India.a The 
“indigenous culture of conflict” in the subcontinent also emanates from these most stable and 
dominant social institutions when they undergo segmentation. This article examines these 
primary kinship institutions, and indigenous ‘culture of conflict’ as units of analysis to study 
Pakistan-India rivalry. 
The main argument of this study is that the moralities of a ‘culture of conflict’ associated within 
kinship institutions are also transposed into other institutions of society, and, hence state, which 
effect policy making. It is not to say that macro socio-economic or politico-religious variables 
are/were not relevant behind the animosity between both nations, but the emphasis is on the 
argument of how the conflict behaviour shaped within kinship institutions creates certain moral 
views which effect peoples’ conflict behaviour in wider domains of society and nation.  
In the following section, I will use a qualitative research paradigm as a prelude to develop my 
own theoretical model for analysing Pakistan-India conflict i.e. the Sharike-Bazi model. I will 
draw upon Psycho-Cultural Interpretive theory of conflict presented by Ross (1995) to explain 
the general characteristics of ‘culture of conflict’ in Pakistan. Ross (1995) explains how 
conflict is always a cultural behaviour and how people develop conflict behaviour in early 
socialization within their immediate social institutions e.g. family and extended family 
networks.  
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A clear definition of conflict that can be applied widely across cultural settings is: “conflict 
means perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that parties’ current aspirations cannot be 
achieved simultaneously” (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim, 1994, p. 4). It implies that considering the 
perceptual part of the conflict is equally important, which in turn, is mostly shaped by culture. 
Culture shapes peoples’ perception and behaviour about conflict (Ross, 1993, p. 21). The 
‘Culture of Conflict’ is “society’s specific norms, practices, and institutions associated with 
conflict’ (Ross, 1993, p. 183). In short, a ‘culture of conflict’ is a prevailing worldview in any 
particular society which is used to handle the conflict. 
Different institutions can play important roles in peoples’ lives to develop certain conflict 
behaviours. The psycho-cultural analysis of conflict focuses on a group’s psycho-cultural 
dispositions or culturally shared response tendencies toward conflict; learned through primary 
social institutions (Ross, 1995). These dispositions, in turn, are crucial in generating an 
interpretive mechanism for people to perceive the conflict, and deal with it. Therefore, 
psychologically, people frame every conflict around them, according to the cultural norms they 
had learned from their early socialization. For example, abusing someone’s elder brother might 
have different responses in different cultures. Such a wrong-doer might be murdered in some 
traditional society, such as Punjab-Pakistan. 
At the core of psycho-cultural interpretation theory is the notion that the inner worlds of people 
in a culture are socially constructed, rooted in the earliest social relationships. An individual’s 
internal world contains primordial models of human interaction involving nurturance, conflict, 
authority, power and community (Ross, 1995). The theory gives a central role to culturally 
rooted social and psychological processes which produce dispositions – shared images, 
perceptions of the external world, and motives for individual and group behaviour. Dispositions 
formed in early social relationships and internalized images of the world established in family 
contexts provide a template for later relations involving larger social aggregates, such as those 
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involving ethnic identities and are called upon later at the time of high-anxiety events, such as 
communal conflicts (Ross, 1995). 
Culture always remains a factor in conflict, whether it plays a central role or influences it 
quietly. LeBaron (2003) adds that for any conflict that touches us where it matters (where we 
make meaning and hold our identities) there is always a cultural component. Intractable 
conflicts like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the India-Pakistan conflict are not just about 
territorial, boundary, and sovereignty issues – they are also about acknowledgment, 
representation, and legitimization of different identities and ways of living, being, and making 
meaning (LeBaron & Venashri, 2006, p. 16). Culture is inextricable from conflict, though it 
does not cause it. When differences surface in families, organizations, or communities, culture 
is always present, shaping perceptions, attitudes, behaviours and outcomes. Therefore, 
studying societies’ cultural methods of conflict dealing can be a useful way to understand their 
perception about conflict in wider domains. 
People map their ‘idealized’ family models onto the societal domain and these models produce 
certain moral systems which effect peoples’ political behaviour for how the nation should be 
governed (Lakoff, 1996). I have argued that conflict dynamics and behaviour related to these 
“idealized” family models are also mapped onto wider domains, such as society and nation. 
Therefore, I will use conflict dynamics of joint/extended family – an idealized family model in 
Pakistan – to analyse Pakistani society’s overall conflict behaviour. The argument is also 
supported by Ross (1995) that people react in conflict situations in wider domains according 
to specific dispositions invoked in such situations; rooted in early experience. The analogy-
making method will help to compare family level conflict behaviour to that of Pakistani conflict 
behaviour as a nation. 
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The family and lineage are the most important institutions that constitute the primary building 
blocks of Indian identity (Kakar, 2006). For Pakistanis, all political or religious ideologies are 
temporary, but kinship group identity is the most enduring one (Lieven, 2012). Therefore, no 
‘ism’ is more dominating than ‘family-ism’ in both societies. From the ranks of family, people 
learn to understand the differences between right and wrong. People learn from their family 
how to react in conflicts with other members of the society; and the states are nothing but the 
thermostat of their societies’ spirit as Lebow (2008) has noted.  
Pakistanis tend to impose some kind of kin relation to all individuals that they interact with 
(Lyon, 2004, p. 97). The behaviours learned within kinship institutions not only influences the 
mental programming of people in Pakistan but also effects the structure and functioning of a 
number of institutions other than the family. South Asian societies have an integrative and 
hierarchical relationship between individual and ‘collectivity’, which are mapped onto other 
societal functions and institutions (Channabasavanna & Bhatti, 1982). The rules learnt by 
people through these powerful kinship organizations are observed even in today’s high-tech 
modern organizations, not to mention political institutions (Kakar & Kakar, 2009). It can be 
inferred, therefore, that conflict behaviour learned within these institutions is also transposed 
and reflected in the other institutions responsible for policy making (especially in Pakistan). 
 
A central tenet of psycho-cultural approach is to compare the complexities of national 
behaviour, character and culture with the behaviour, character and culture of individuals. This 
approach attempts to understand the integration of institutions in a culture in terms of the basic 
personality-forming institutions and their impact on the other institutions of society (Stoddart 
& Hession, 1951). It deals with the special personality drives and emotional characteristics in 
any society, which these micro primary institutions develop in its people, which are later 
reflected in other macro institutions. The behaviour of people is shaped by their culture in ways 
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far below the level of consciousness, and, culture and mind cannot be distinguished from each 
other (Cole, 1998). Put it simply, human psyche and culture are inseparable and co-construct 
each other. This paper examines culturally conditioned habits, of conflict perception and 
behaviour which are somehow unconscious, because they shape conflict behaviour in both 
societies which then reflects in the larger picture of conflict dynamics between two states.  
 
Sharike-Bazi Culture of Conflict – An Analogy for Pakistan-India Conflict 
In this section, the indigenous Pakistani culture of conflict ‘Sharike-Bazi’ is explained by 
analysing the existing ethnographic literature. The dynamics of this culture of conflict has also 
been tested as an ‘analogy’ against Pakistan’s conflict behaviour towards India. It is imperative 
to mention here that the scope of this paper is not to present empirical evidence in detail, but 
to present indigenous ‘culture of conflict’ as a theoretical model for further investigation. 
However, empirical evidence is provided, where necessary, to justify the workability of this 
model. 
The indigenous Sharike-Bazi conflict model highlights the demands of separation (Batwara) 
by one sibling from the ‘other’ but denied a fair share. The ‘wronged’ brother then becomes 
extra competitive to right the wrong done to him. The ‘other’ brother, on the other hand, always 
tries to undo the new identity of his departing brother. I propose that Pakistan perceives herself 
as the ‘wronged’ brother in this dyad; revengeful against the ‘other’ brother ‘India’ over the 
unfair distribution of assets, and uncomfortable with the dominance of the ‘other’ estranged 
brother – now a sworn enemy. 
In the subcontinent, cases where brothers/cousins live in peace after dividing the property are 
rare, because the division itself is an outcome of their inability to continue living together. 
Disputants blame the ‘other’ both for being the reason and beneficiary of the partition. 
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Similarly, Pakistan developed grievances over unfair division of land (especially Kashmir), 
and other joint assets (military equipment, industrial complexes, bank reserves etc.) inherited 
from British India (Faruqui, 2003, p. 41). India developed its own version that the Muslim 
League’s demand for dividing India was unfair, which resulted in the amputation of mother 
India and the disunion of the Indian family. 
‘Sharike-Bazi’ is a term used in Punjab-Pakistan for the culture of conflict. The Sharike-Bazi 
culture of conflict is also observed in the other provinces of Pakistan (and India) with different 
names, for example, Tarbur in Pashtun areas of Pakistan (Barth, 1959). The selection of the 
Punjab province is crucial because it is the most populous and authoritative province in 
Pakistan. It enjoys an uncontested role in policy making thanks to its overwhelming 
representation in both parliament and military establishment (Lieven, 2012, p. 263). Secondly, 
the Punjab is one of only three provinces which were divided at the time of partition (both India 
and Pakistan have Punjab provinces). Thirdly, Punjab experienced the highest magnitude of 
bloody riots in 1947.  
In subcontinent India and Pakistan, the real or step-brothers and their children live jointly and 
share the inherited resources. They live either under a same roof or in different houses. Usually, 
the Batwara (literally meaning the division of ancestral property) takes place when either of 
the brothers (or a cousin) feels that he is not being given a proper share or respect in the joint-
family. He, therefore, demands partition; the division of resources. Such demand, itself, is a 
starting point of feud between brothers or cousins, because it is considered against the cultural 
norms of integrated families.  
The partition (Batwara) creates conflict, bitterness and hostility if the distribution is not settled 
fairly between both parties. Usually, the departing brother perceives that he is being wronged 
and cheated over resource distribution. The other party, on the other hand, blames the departing 
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party for sowing the seeds of disunity. This bitterness transmutes to the future generations of 
paternal cousins who form a sub-lineage group, which is called Sharika in Punjabi language. 
These warring paternal groups are then engaged in Sharika rivalry for generations; the cousins 
are named as ‘Shariks’, and this rivalry can be termed as ‘Sharike-Bazi’. Viewed this way, 
Pakistan and India can be termed as ‘Sharik’ states (cousin-enemy states), who have been 
engaged in an ongoing rivalry over certain claims against each other since the time of partition 
in 1947. 
Chaudhary (1999) noted that ethnographic literature reveals that people in the subcontinent 
regard their neighbours as their kin. A famous saying states: Hamsaya Ma ka jaya, which 
means ‘a neighbour is our mother’s son’. The near-neighbours are considered closer than far-
relatives (Chaudhary, 1999, p. 17). People in Pakistan tend to transpose their kin relations to 
other people who they regularly interact with (Lyon, 2004). ‘Family’ remains the starting 
reference point to deal with the entire world. Therefore, it is argued, that the people in Pakistan 
(and subcontinent) perceive other people around them in terms of fathers, brothers, uncles, 
cousins, nephews etc. (when on good terms), or rival-uncles, rival cousins, rival nephews etc. 
(when on bad terms). People always use a ‘family’ lens to categorize other people, using 
‘labels’ to call their neighbours, which are fixed for kin relations: for example, Chacha (father’s 
younger brother) or Taya (father’s elder brother) for elderly people; and Beta (son) or Bhatija 
(nephew) for younger ones.  
It can be inferred from the above arguments that how in British India, a familial ‘near-ness’ 
was present between Hindu and Muslim neighbours. Logically, the rupture between two groups 
also developed a familial type of hatred and feud. The dynamics of this conflict can be 
explained better by using this indigenous conflict model. Psychologically, Pakistan 
conceptualizes itself in terms of a lineage (Biradari) and perceives other countries as different 
lineages (Lieven, 2012, p. 12). The India-Pakistan case is a special one, because Pakistanis 
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perceive India as an ‘other’ segment of their own lineage; who wronged them at the time of 
partition (Batwara). The moralities of Sharike-Bazi’ culture of conflict, are therefore reflected 
in relations between these cousin states. 
The psycho-cultural approach lets us to conceptualize Pakistan as a ‘wronged’ brother in this 
Sharika rivalry, who remained in a joint family setup with his Indian brothers and cousins for 
centuries. During the final years of the British raj, he was denied proper representation (or 
respect) in the future setup of the joint family. He, therefore, demanded a separation and asset 
distribution. He also developed grievances against his big brother/cousin India over the unfair 
distribution of assets at the time of partition. The trauma of partition set the future course of 
action for this ‘wronged’ and ‘wounded’ brother who then decided to compete with the Indian 
brother at any cost. On the other hand, the big brother India felt “dishonoured” and decided to 
teach a lesson to his “disobedient” younger brother who brought disunity to the family. 
 
The Main Characteristics of Sharike-Bazi 
The following Punjabi proverbs reveal the psychology behind the Sharike-Bazi culture of 
conflict, which often reflects in Pakistan-India relations.    
1. Sharika’n di kandh deg dyo panwy apni majjh thally Aa Jaye  
(It is always desirable to bring down the wall of opponents (Shariks) even if your own 
buffalo dies under its debris). 
  
2. Sharika’n di kandh pichhy haggan nal ver ni mukdy  
(Only defecating behind the opponents’ wall does not settle scores).  
Both these proverbs communicate some visible messages: that Shariks are not ordinary 
enemies but intimate rivals, who should be competed with even at the cost of your own loss. 
Also, the harm caused to them should be loud and clear, to prove your supremacy.  
Page 18 of 43 
 
‘Land’ always remains a bone of contention between cousins. There is a saying in Punjab ‘as 
we have no land to divide, we have no reason to quarrel’. The other types of conflicts are also 
indirectly related to land. Srinivas (1970, p. 44), an Indian anthropologist, describes in detail 
the conflicts among family members on the division of land and property that result into 
Sharika rivalry. I have categorized these explanations into numeric (1-8) to highlight the 
different phases of Sharike-Bazi. The different stages of Sharike-Bazi help us to build an 
‘analogous model’ for analysing different phases of Pakistan-India relations.  
(1)‘Elders concede that it is better to divide than to quarrel perpetually. (2) Then a 
second set of quarrels occur – how should the property be divided and who should get 
what? There are some conventions, but they do not prevent quarrels. (3) After the 
property, has been divided, one member feels that he has fared badly, and he demands 
redistribution. (4) In such a case, adjustments are made with some difficulty and the 
document registered to ensure the similar demands are not made again. (5) Another set 
of quarrels starts during the paddy transplantation season where the bunds separating 
the flats are trimmed, and brothers, who are usually neighbours, accuse each other of 
encroachment. (6) Such disputes go on for years. (7) The partition of property does not 
promise amity and it is frequently found that adult brothers are not on speaking terms 
with each other. (8) While members of a lineage show solidarity in relation to lineage, 
among themselves there are tensions. The narrower the lineage-span, the greater the 
tension’. 
 
The Sharike-Bazi conflicts start in the life time of elders (usually real brothers), but in the most 
cases the relationship of mutual respect is maintained (Chaudhary, 1999, p. 51). The bitter 
quarrels arise between the coming generations of cousins for resettling the distribution over the 
division of the land etc. There always remain different unpleasant memories on the division of 
ancestral land and other things (Jaddi Virsa). This division can be readjusted if brothers agree 
mutually in their life-time. It is not easy to demand a redistribution after a generation’s gap.  
Another factor contributing to Sharike-Bazi is the ‘misuse’ of authority and respect by the elder 
brothers. The brothers having the greater number of sons try to grab the maximum share from 
the combined resources owing to their numerical strength and physical requirements. It violates 
the cultural norms in the subcontinent where elder brothers are expected to treat their younger 
Page 19 of 43 
 
siblings with generosity. Therefore, it leads to demands of asset division (Batwara) from the 
brother having lesser number of sons.  
Considering ‘Sharike-Bazi’ as an analogous model, the above paragraphs explains the mindset 
behind Sardar Patel’s (the first deputy prime minister of India) statement when he conceded to 
the demand of ‘Pakistan’ in 1947 by saying that ‘it is better to live separately in peace than to 
live together and quarrel all the time’ (Azad, 2014, p. 201). Mr. Jinnah (the founding father of 
Pakistan) was quite optimistic that ‘division’ would improve the relations between two nations 
(Ahmed, 1997). During the famous Gandhi-Jinnah Talks in 1944 to settle the issue of partition, 
Gandhi (the founding father of India) never agreed to use the term ‘nation’ for either group and 
proceeded on the assumption that Hindus and Muslim constitute a ‘family’ and Muslim family 
members want to live separately (Wolpert, 1984, p. 231; Singh, 2010). It also implies that had 
the founding fathers of both nations lived for more years after partition, the higher were the 
chances for a Pakistan-India rapprochement. As a Sharika rule, the differences which erupted 
between Jinnah and Gandhi were to be carried over into both nations as a legacy. 
Being wronged at the time of partition has always been Pakistani narrative. One Pakistani prime 
minister, Zulfikar Bhutto, complained about unfair distribution of assets as:  
“The British Government could not have done more to tilt the balance of advantage in 
India’s favour…. No attempt was made to provide Pakistan with the minimum 
requirements for administration, defence, and finance. The country was left to fend for 
herself. In the maintenance of law and order, the division of assets, military stores, and 
sterling balances, and even in the transfer of funds, India was given a stranglehold over 
Pakistan” (Bhutto, 1969, Chapter 18). 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that Kashmir became an intractable issue between the two 
‘cousin’ or Sharik states. Pakistanis equate Kashmir to Jannat (paradise) and Mr. Jinnah 
compared it to the jugular vein of Pakistan. Jawaharlal Nehru’s (one of the founding fathers of 
India) attachment to Kashmir can be assessed from his remarks that: ‘In the same way that 
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Calais was written on Mary’s heart, Kashmir is written on mine’ (Bolitho, 1954, p. 206). 
Therefore, Pakistanis assume Kashmir as their lost ‘Jaddi Virsa’ (ancestral property). 
It implies that the fear of religious annihilation was not the only reason behind the Muslim 
minority’s demand for a separate homeland, but it came directly from being ‘neglected’ and 
disrespected in the joint setup. The Agha Khan (the founding father of the Muslim League) 
narrates how Mr. Gandhi did not treat Muslims in a “fatherly” way during the second Round 
Table Conference in London to settle the communal issue. It is interesting to recall here that 
Mr. Gandhi was literally called  Bapu (the father) by both Muslims and the Hindus. Agha Khan 
recollected in his memoir that  the Muslims were expecting a father-like affection from Gandhi 
but were denied: 
“…. I opened it by saying to Mahatmaji (Gandhi) that were he now to show himself a 
real father to India’s Muslims, they would respond by helping him, to the utmost of 
their ability, in his struggle for India’s independence. Mahatmaji (the great soul) turned 
to face me. ‘I cannot in truth say’, he observed, ‘that I have any feelings of paternal 
love for Muslims. But if you put the matter on ground of political necessity’….” (Singh, 
2010, p. 190).  
 
In Sharike-Bazi conflict dynamics, self-esteem and honour (Izzat) is the other major cause of 
conflict among cousins, which leads to indirect conflicts. It is worth mentioning here that Izzat 
competition starts after the parting of ways. It remains a joint family asset before separation. 
After partition, Izzat is divided between parties and therefore much sought after. The following 
quote explains how ‘Izzat’ contributes towards the mental construction of local people:   
“Every Indian, from the highest to the lowest, has his Izzat, or name to keep. After his 
son, it is his most cherished possession, and if it is injured he is an unhappy man. And 
in such a sensitive race there is nothing easier to injure than the Izzat. The injury may 
be purely imaginary, but it is no less keenly felt…. Moreover, he will neither forget it 
nor forgive the man who did it” (Walsh, 1929, p. 84). 
 
Page 21 of 43 
 
An increase in income and land can bring Izzat to someone, but this is only one of many 
contributing factors (Eglar, 1960, p. 45). There is a saying that ‘that the prostitutes have a lot 
of money, but no Izzat’ (Chaudhary, 1999, p. 65). You may lose Izzat without losing wealth or 
land. It is like the difference between ‘standing’ and ‘honour’. The Izzat is earned by succouring 
people who expect it from you.  
It explains why India lacks the proper status and ‘Izzat’ in South Asian family because he is 
incapable of extending the ‘desired’ amount of care and nurture to other countries in the region; 
especially Pakistan. Sharika analogy also explains why bad blood developed between Mr. 
Jinnah and the Congress leaders as he was denied the desired status (Izzat) in the Congress 
caucus. He literally used the words “it is parting of ways” before going to self-exile in London 
during the 1930s (Bolitho, 1954, p. 95; Wolpert, 1984). The honour of family is not divided 
equally between brothers, normally the eldest inherits it. This is how India, by default, took 
over the seat of ‘British India’ in all international organizations and Pakistan had to start afresh 
(Pande, 2011, p. 17).  
For this reason, the prestige factor is always taken care of in India-Pakistan relations. 
Responding to five Indian nuclear tests in 1998, Pakistan conducted six tests (one more) to 
satisfy herself psychologically, and to prove to the entire world that ‘we are no less than India’. 
At that time, the Pakistani ‘civilian’ prime-minister could maximise aid and sympathy from the 
international community, but the public pressure did not let on Pakistan to become “rational”. 
This act was in line with the local idiom “Pagg Uchi ho jaye” (turban must stay high) and 
implies that Pakistani foreign policy revolves around acquiring prestige from the reference 
point of India. 
In Sharike-Bazi conflict dynamics, the party that manages to grab more resources out of an 
inherited share and acquires a powerful status (powerful Sharik), starts belittling the other party 
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(weaker Sharik). However, weaker parties never acknowledge the standing of their powerful 
Shariks. They are always engaged in discrediting each other. The resourceful party makes the 
weaker one feel that he is not even worthy to compete. She boasts in such a manner that the 
weak party hurts psychologically as it directly attacks her honour (Izzat). The weaker party 
then resorts to every possible tactic to hurt the stronger party back and regain her prestige. Both 
Sharik parties sometimes use unlawful tactics to undermine each other. They can join hands 
with local criminal elements to enhance their strength and use it against their Shariks. The 
weaker Shariks are always psychologically obsessed that people should not  perceive them as 
‘weak’ against their powerful Shariks.  
It explains the use of the word ‘pygmy’ to describe Pakistan by Pandit Nehru when Pakistan 
went into alliance with the USA in early 1950s (Pande, 2011, p. 94). It also explains the mindset 
behind using non-state actors by both India and Pakistan to harm each other. In Sharike-Bazi, 
the powerful Sharik manoeuvres things to deprive his brother/cousin of due shares so that he 
may not survive and return to the joint setup. It causes more bitterness for the departing party. 
Field Marshal Auchinleck, the Chief of British Indian Army expressed similar views in October 
1948 that the Indian cabinet was determined to undo Pakistan (Burke, 1973, p. 10). It also 
explains the psychology behind the statements of many Indian leaders soon after Partition, that 
Pakistan would not survive and would  merge back into mother-land India. Pakistan’s oft-
repeated demand to the international community to be treated on par with India can also be 
explained from this perspective. 
The Sharike-Bazi urges people to make alliances outside their own kin groups and lineages to 
undermine the power of each other. The alliances in the subcontinent are made with those 
people with whom one is not in competition (Barth, 1959), which means who are not Shariks. 
It is also imperative to mention that people in the subcontinent learn that people around them 
should either obey them or should be obeyed.  As the Marathi poet Govindraj puts it that Indian 
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society is made up of men ‘who bow their heads to the kicks from above and who 
simultaneously give a kick below’ (Kakar & Kakar, 2009, p. 27). Pakistanis are also culturally 
tuned to form asymmetrical relations with one another (Lyon, 2004, p. 2). Similarly, the Sharik 
parties tend to be absorbed into these patron-client structures to compete with their enemy 
cousins. It explains what drove Pakistan to be a part of hegemonic-alliances with the USA 
(CEATO and SENTO) in 1950s. It was just to compete with India. 
There are many other characteristics and dynamics of Sharika rivalry, which are analogous to 
India-Pakistan relations. The jealousy factor remains very crucial between warring groups and 
determines their mutual relations. ‘Face-saving’ remains a hindrance for resolving mutual 
conflicts between such groups. The empirical evidence for all these characteristics can be found 
in India-Pakistan relations on one pretext or another.  
There is a famous Punjabi saying that “Maaran to drana changa” which means it is better to 
threaten than kill. The threat of using force is important than actually using force in such 
relations. The exhibition of weapons is, therefore, a norm in Sharika rivalry, just to threaten 
the opponents.  
Pakistani nuclear build-up can be explained by the logic of “uncertainty about adversary state’s 
intentions” (Mearsheimer, 2014), which also forces state’s leaders to behave “rationally” to 
seek other peaceful means (Sagan & Waltz, 1995). However, nuclear capability can also tempt 
small states like Pakistan to take risks against powerful opponents like India (Kapur, 2007, p. 
45). Therefore, this is not the only explanation for the Pakistan-India arms-race and their 
repeated military build-ups, but it can also be explained in terms of an outcome of a specific 
historical and strategic conflict culture — which shapes the perception of both nations against 
each other. Psychologically, leaders’ in both states try to acquire nuclear supremacy to bolster 
their own individual popularity (Ganguly, 2002, pp. 127-38). I argue that Pakistani leaders’ 
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motivation to gain nuclear supremacy against India is owed to a Sharike-Bazi conflict 
syndrome. Pakistani leaders’ intent is to be recognized as “equal” to India by the international 
family, which is also a popular demand. Hence, the ‘threat’ of nuclear attack always remains 
an important factor in their bilateral relations. 
 
The Psycho-Genesis of Pakistan-India Conflict 
As a Pakistani native, I have observed closely that the majority of people in Pakistan hold anti-
Indian sentiments, stemming from the perception of  being ‘wronged’ and ‘cheated’ at the time 
of partition. They are of the view that Pakistan was deprived of its due shares at the time of 
partition. They also firmly believe that India seized the ‘land’ of Kashmir by force, and that if 
provided a chance India would assimilate Pakistan back into its territory. There is a general 
impression among people that ‘Hindus’ were not ready to share wealth and power with 
‘Muslims’ in British India, and they did not want Muslims to progress socially and 
economically. To support their arguments, these people compare their better lives to that of the 
plight of Indian Muslims.  
However, there is also another side of their sentiments. There exists a nostalgia among 
Pakistani people that the India-Pakistan partition could have been avoided, and they could have 
managed to live together as one unit. They also repent that opting for a separate state made the 
lives of left-over Muslims in India so miserable, as they had to face the wrath of the Hindu 
community. They also long for the harmonious relations between two communities in the past. 
During partition riots, one can find thousands of examples when people from both sides acted 
in a “brotherly” way to save the honour of the ‘other’ community’s women (Ahmed, 2012). 
These mixed feelings of love and hate have been transferred from families to families, and 
generations to generations. Emotional scenes are seen when someone crosses the border to visit 
his native place. People on both sides extend warmth and love to such visitors (hundreds of 
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such videos are available on youtube.com). There is a rich fictional literature available in terms 
of poetry, prose and films that explain how an abrupt tide of hatred turned both groups from 
brothers to sworn enemies.  
This paper proposes that Pakistani people possess similar sentiments for Indians as they 
normally possess for their estranged cousins; the cousins to whom they compete for prestige 
after family feuds. To the surprise of many Westerners, people in the subcontinent still refer to 
the India-Pakistan partition as ‘Batwara’; a term fixed for the distribution of ancestral property 
among blood relations. It is more surprising that even after the use of the words ‘brothers’ and 
‘family’ for Hindus and Muslims by the founding fathers of both nations, several leading 
political figures, historians and even political scientists, no scholar has ever made a serious 
attempt to theoretically explore the indigenous ‘culture of conflict’ to explain India-Pakistan 
rivalry. This model directly explains how proximity implodes between family members and 
turns into hate. The analysts have either stressed the syncretic part of Indian culture by 
following the Muslim poet Iqbal’s line, “Religion does not teach mutual enmity” (Kakar, 1996, 
p. 38), or they have treated both groups along contradictory cultural and religious lines.  
 
The Hindu-Muslim history in the subcontinent is neither all about peace nor is it all about 
conflict. They have been representing a hybrid history of family like conflict and synthesis in 
the subcontinent. There is a famous saying in Punjabi language that ‘where there are two 
vessels, they are likely to collide and make a noise’ meaning that people in contact, cannot 
remain without conflict. The Muslims, despite being monotheists, coexisted peacefully with 
perceived polytheist Hindus. Thanks to large scale conversions from Hinduism to Islam, both 
communities had similar lineage groups. Obviously, there were religious differences between 
both groups, but a ‘communal’ feel remained absent until partition. This was one of the major 
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reasons that until the last days of the British Raj, the Muslim majority state of Kashmir was 
ruled by a Hindu while the Hindu majority state of Hyderabad had a Muslim monarch. 
There is always a special characteristic to the enmity for a person who resembles us most but 
for some reasons we do not accept him as ‘us’. Even minor differences between us and them 
are therefore exaggerated as unbridgeable chasms in what Freud called the ‘narcissism of minor 
differences’ (Blok, 1998). Unconsciously, people exaggerate their ‘minor’ differences when 
there are not many visible differences among them. Such differences can be among brothers, 
cousins or neighbours; neighbours are the ones whom we can consider as a rival (Kakar, 1996). 
Interestingly, there is a famous proverb in the subcontinent that grants neighbours the status 
equal to one’s mother’s sons (Hamsaya, Maa ka Jaya). Therefore, unconsciously, the enemies 
like us are offered extra competition by us.  
People belong to multiple cultures centred around a wide variety of shared identities, including 
race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, language, geographical setting, socioeconomic class, 
profession, gender etc. (LeBaron, 2003, p. 10). Therefore, the often-used variable of ‘religion’ 
does not explain the animosity between two groups to its entirety. For being the ‘minor’ 
difference among people sharing so many other identities; religion was, therefore, stressed 
upon by both groups which gave way to generational memories to recall historical antipathy 
between both groups. This is how religion was to play its role in constructing the future national 
identity for Pakistanis. Religion had surfaced with much intensity with the departure of the 
British, because people magnify their internal trivial differences in the absence of any 
combined threat or enemy as noted by Volkan (1986). Interestingly, the religious history of 
both groups is also replete with Sharika dynamics. For example, the ancient Indian epic 
Mahabharata revolves around the war of succession between patrilineal cousins in the ‘Great 
battle of Kurukshetra’, while the very first Islamic battle ‘Ghazwa-e-Badr’ against infidels, 
was also between fraternal cousins. 
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Both groups never emphasised ‘religion’ against their colonial masters or started any holy war. 
Ideally, the Hindus should have hated the (Christian) British equally for being invaders and 
imperialists like Muslims. Beef-eating was also common between both; a practice much hated 
by Hindus. However, religious hatred never exploded between Hindus and British outsiders as 
they remained strangers, not becoming ‘familiar’ as Muslims did, thus, acquiring the status of 
‘other’ (Kakar, 1996, p. 22).   
The British never became a part of the Indian family as Muslims did, because Hindus and 
Muslims lived side by side for more than a millennium and shared daily life. A psychological 
feeling of near-ness had developed between the two communities. India was the place where 
the lives of different communities were intertwined in love and hate, due to proximity, not 
distance. Therefore, nearness, rather than distance, is more to do with the venom in ethnic and 
religious violence in South Asia (Nandy, 2001). It provides rationale to investigate the 
Pakistan-India conflict by situating it in the same cultural world and using family conflict 
dynamics.  
As William Blake said: “it is easier to forgive an enemy than to forgive a friend”. A few verses 
by a Punjabi-Pakistani poet Ustad Damen are quoted here to seek insight into the India-Pakistan 
problem. He had travelled to India after partition and recited this poem in a seminar. The 
audience, including prime-minister Nehru, burst into tears after hearing these verses.   
We may not say it but know it well 
You lost your way. We too. 
Partition has destroyed us friends. 
You too, and us. 
The wakeful have quite plundered us. 
You slept the while, and we. 
Into the jaws of death alive 
You were flung. We too. 
Life still may stir in us again: 
You are stunned yet, and we. 
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The redness of the eyes betrays 
You too have wept, and we.b 
Another of Damen’s verses explains Pakistan India partition in these words: 
A strange divide has ensued to Pakistan; It has been cut into two sides / halves 
(Partition of India and Pakistan). 
How can surgeons cure Pakistan; while ‘ointment’ is in this side, and ‘wound’ is in 
other side. 
How can we reach at destination; while ‘horse’ is in this side, and ‘cart is in other 
side.c 
 
The roots of Pakistan’s rivalry with India lie in how Pakistan emerged as a nation out of 
colonial India. The India-Pakistan Sharika-dyad cannot be explained without mentioning the 
Jinnah-Gandhi-Nehru triad, who are unequivocal founding fathers of both nations. The 
antagonistic relationship among these three titans had far reaching results in locking their 
followers (ideological sons) in ‘ever-red’ rivalry. Even after the seventy years of partition, more 
than one billion people in the subcontinent are still engaged in a debate about who the villain  
responsible for the ‘Batwara’ of British India was. Naturally, people in both countries blame 
the ‘other’ father of nation for this partition. 
It is widely believed that partition and communal riots could have been avoided if these father 
figures had overcome their mutual differences. The masses were politically illiterate in those 
times and they just followed their beloved leaders blindly. People in the subcontinent are 
psycho-culturally tuned to take their political leaders or any institutional head as their own 
father. The metaphors of kin relations are, therefore, used for political leaders in the 
subcontinent. 
India-Pakistan rivalry can also be explained as the legacy of hostility between Indian National 
Congress, and the Muslim League led by Jinnah. Jinnah had to leave the former party because 
he was not accommodated properly and was dubbed as “spoilt child” by senior Congress 
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leaders (Bolitho, 1954, p. 94). Both parties, therefore, developed incompatible views regarding 
the future of India after the departure of the British. It set the path for post-1947 relations 
between two states (McLoed, 2008, p. 1). From the outside, it resembles nothing so much as a 
family feud – and psychologically speaking, it’s a very apt analogy. 
Although, the Muslim demand for separate homeland can be explained as their desire for 
regaining ‘power’ they had enjoyed for centuries during their imperial rule over India. 
However, the rupture between two communities can also be traced as to how the Congress 
party dealt with the Muslim League during the last years of the British raj. As partition neared, 
the Muslims began to feel that their reservations were not properly considered, and their 
demands were thus not met. The Muslim League was ignored and humiliated after Congress’s 
victory in 1937 which set the path for Pakistan (Khaliquzzaman, 1961). The Muslims, suddenly 
the ‘junior’ family members, felt neglected – and as younger siblings oftentimes do, they 
became extra-competitive. It had created a sense of ‘not mattering at all’ among the Muslim 
minority who naturally wished ‘parity’ with their Hindu counterparts. Such combative feelings 
remained dormant within both groups in the past because minority Muslims were the rulers 
themselves, whereas the majority Hindus were also well accommodated in state apparatus 
owing to their obvious numeric strength.   
The Hindu-Muslim communal divide began to widen with the increasing differences between 
the founding fathers. Gandhi’s role can be considered as of a weak ‘father’ or elder brother 
who struggled in vain to keep the integrity of family. He could neither convince Jinnah nor 
Nehru to keep the family united. Both were strong contenders to family headship. During the 
last days of the Raj, Gandhi had proposed to the last British viceroy to appoint Jinnah as the 
future premier so that the unity of India may be restored. But to his own dismay, Jawaharlal 
did not agree to this proposal. The mutual differences between Jinnah and Nehru remained a 
major factor in India’s vivisection (Singh, 2010, p. 502).  
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Viewed this way, the India-Pakistan conflict owes more to historical and psychological 
“nearness” than to mere competition for resources or territory. And that much is clear in the 
language they use to talk about each other. For example, in many parts of the subcontinent, 
especially in both Punjabs, the word used for the 1947 partition is ‘Batwara’, which literally 
means “the distribution of ancestral land” between brothers or patrilineal cousins. The word 
comes with resonances that the alternate English word “partition” simply does not carry: 
harmonious family; painful division; cousin rivalry; love-hate competition. The usage of this 
word “Batwara” substantiates the assumption that Sharike-Bazi conflict dynamics are present 
in India-Pakistan conflict. The political elite from both sides appear to compete with each other 
like patrilineal cousins, and always struggle to move the legacy of their national fathers 
forward.  
Interestingly, India has always used the metaphor of the south Asian family. Owing to her 
geographical, demographic, and economic supremacy; India claims the ‘big brother’ role in the 
south Asian family, which is denied by Pakistan on the pretext that India had failed to fulfil the 
cultural expectations associated with this role. As a cultural rule, elder brothers are expected to 
be tolerant and generous. But India’s policy towards Pakistan proved to be the acme of power 
politics, which nourished the most truculent instincts in Pakistan’s psychology and political 
culture (Malik, 1993). Therefore, since partition, India’s leading role in South Asia is 
persistently challenged by Pakistan (Buzan & Rizvi, 1986).  
After partition, the future course of the Pakistani state was determined by certain psychological 
constructs: feeling of being ‘wronged’ at the time of partition, and the desire of competing with 
Indians at any cost. These psychological constructs can be traced in Sharika conflict dynamics. 
This was the setting stage for Pakistanis as a nation state. These psychological constructs led 
Pakistan’s nascent state to adopt religion as a path, and the army as its saviour. As Pakistani 
military president Zia once said:  
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‘Turkey or Egypt, if they stop being aggressively Muslim, they will remain exactly 
what they are…. But if Pakistan does not become and remain aggressively Islamic it 
will become India again….. swamped by this all enveloping embrace of India’ (Singh, 
2010, p. 497).  
 
Interestingly, it was not a military, but a civilian prime minister, Bhutto, who talked about 
“eating grass for getting nuclear bomb” (Khan, 2012, p. 135) after 1971 defeat; and, declared 
a 1000-year war against Indians in UN general assembly (Wolpert, 1993). He refused the 
international community’s advice to become realistic and accept Indian regional supremacy, 
by firmly demanding “equitable” settlement for “honourable” peace (Bhutto, 1969, Chapter 
18). He became popular after running a hate-campaign against Ayub (a military dictator) for 
signing the Tashkent ceasefire accord with India to end the 1965 war.  He had emerged as the 
uncontested civilian leader from west Pakistan, for having an aggressive anti-Indian stance.  
Therefore, it is inadequate to say that only the army pursues aggressive policies against India 
for their bureaucratic ends. This bitter competitive urge is an outcome of interactive process 
between masses and political elite, which drives Pakistani leaders, army officers and populace 
to defy India’s obvious demographic, economic and military supremacy. It results from certain 
moral views created by indigenous conflict culture. It is always desirable that your country 
should have the capacity to defend itself but believing that your country can/should defeat a 
country ten times larger than your own can be better explained through a psycho-cultural 
analysis.  
It is also worth mentioning that the India-Pakistan relationship is not always an equation of 
hate-hate, but it has been a combination of love and hate, and both states have responded 
cooperatively to a few possibly contentious issues, such as ‘water-sharing’. Both rivals have 
been successful to find some solutions, if the element of “prestige” was not involved (Malik, 
1993). 
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The Significance of Sharike-Bazi Conflict Theory 
 
This paper has presented the Sharike-Bazi conflict model as an exploratory theory to analyse 
India-Pakistan emotion-laden and asymmetric rivalry, which is a persistent challenge to 
regional security in the Asian sub-continent. The study of indigenous ‘culture of conflict’ 
enables us to peek into peoples’ indigenous conflict behaviour and to use them as an ‘analogy’ 
in the context of nation-states, which are said to be wrapped in several institutional and 
bureaucratic layers. Arguably, preindustrial societies and modern-day nation-states differ in 
many ways but none of these suggest obvious reasons why the dynamics of conflict would not 
be similar in each (Ross, 1993, p. 152).     
Pakistan and India can be related as two ‘parted’ segments of a family (or lineage) as Lieven 
(2012) has observed that Pakistanis perceive themselves in terms of a lineage group in world 
community. The conflict between the two had led the both communities to end up in rival 
nation-states. Sharike-Bazi conflict theory takes people and their conflict behaviour as units of 
analysis. The better way to understand a state’s action is to analyse the most influential social 
institutions/actors in society. In the Pakistan-India case, these are kinship institutions that create 
certain moral views regarding emotions, conflict-perception, anger, friendship, enmity etc. in 
its people. 
The fateful factor of prestige (Izzat) in Sharike-Bazi theory is not supported by the realists. To 
them, the ultimate ‘end’ of a state is ‘power’ and policy makers try to attain power to maximize 
their relative power in the international system. The ‘States pursue the policy of imperialism 
by acquiring more power’ (Morgenthau, 1985, p.62). However, for Pakistan, the pursuit of 
power seems to aim at maximising its “prestige” against India, and to prove to the international 
community that “Look! Pakistan has ‘survived’ against all odds; we deserve to be treated on 
par with India”. The explanation for Pakistan’s behaviour can be drawn from Weber (1994) 
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who defined ‘honour’ and ‘prestige’ as important variables in interstate relations. Power is a 
mean to an end, not an end in itself; therefore, any theory about politics must be rooted in some 
understanding of those “ends” (Max Weber cited in Lebow, 2008, p.22).  
The Sharike-Bazi theory is related to the ‘character’ and ‘behaviour’ of a state; how states can 
exhibit the attributes of its people’s behaviour and psyche. It explains how Pakistani state’s 
institutions, sometimes, reflect human character. Lebow (2008) notes that states formulate 
policies based on the need for self-esteem and people seek self-esteem not only through 
personal activities, but through the social units to which they are attached, such as sports teams 
and nations. It explains why Pakistan-India cricket matches are always termed as ‘cricket-
rivalry’ by international commentators for their emotional spirit. Although, the ‘spirit’ is purely 
a human drive; organizations and states do not have psyche and cannot be treated as persons, 
but they can respond to the needs of spirit in the same manner as they do to the material needs 
of their citizens (Lebow, 2008). These observations support the argument made in this paper 
that it is Sharike-Bazi ‘psyche’ and ‘spirit’ that has been institutionalized by both states – 
especially by Pakistan for being the weaker player.  
 
Sharike-Bazi theory explains “rationality” as a learned cultural concept, which might challenge 
the realist notion of rationality based upon material interests. Structural theorists find rationality 
in the state, whereas, social psychologists identify rationality within the motives, goals, 
emotions, and cognition of individual actors (Weingarten, 1993, p. 187). The paper has argued 
that it is family dynamics, informed by their ‘culture’, that shape Pakistani actors’ “rationality” 
for interpreting actions and motives, which serve the same explanatory role for them as 
‘material interests’ do for realists.  
Owing to their conflict prone character, India-Pakistan relations and their long-standing 
conflicts have been discussed mostly by using realist paradigms which do not offer holistic 
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understanding of their conflict dynamics. It is not to say that rational/material theories are not 
explanatory; but they are incomplete in the Pakistan-India case. For example, for realists, there 
is no cultural, ideological, religious or historical enmity between India and Pakistan (McLeod, 
2008, p.10). However, such ideational factors provide both states with suitable “rationality” 
(Vasquez, 2005).  
 
I, therefore, argue that Sharike-Bazi conflict theory makes an ideational alliance with 
Constructivism, which can offer a more complete and substantive understanding of Pakistan-
India conflict as Chatterjee (2008) has noted. The paper has examined in detail why and how  
actors adopt certain conflict behaviour, which stems from their socially accrued values from 
the institution of family. This conflict behaviour when extrapolated to the level of state 
policymaking provides the actors with a “rationale” while assessing the suitability of certain 
options for action. It is in line with the Constructivist “logic of appropriateness” (Reus-Smit, 
2009, p. 221) that actors’ choices are also based upon specific rule-guided behaviour and 
identity, not always upon cost-benefit analysis.  
Wendt’s famous illustration ‘500 British nuclear weapons are less threatening to the United 
States than 5 North Korean nuclear weapons’ (Wendt, 1995, p. 73) can explain that 
“perception” makes Pakistan feel threatened by India’s nuclear weapons, and vice versa. 
Simply put, if people and the political elite of a state perceive some other state as hostile, they 
would prepare for wars, expect wars, and will fight wars, and vice versa. However, the State 
remains the principal unit of analysis for Constructivists; state identity is constituted by state 
practices where peoples’ and policy makers’ ideas, beliefs, and perception about other states is 
a crucial factor (Wendt, 1999, pp. 215-24).  
 
It can be argued therefore that origins and practices that produce and reproduce state identity 
are not explained well in Constructivism and are said to emerge from the interactions between 
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states as Larson (2012) has observed. However, Sharika theory spells out that Pakistani state 
identity is the outcome of an interactive process between actors’ individual psychology and 
their larger socio-political institutions. It also helps the Constructivists in finding the cultural 
roots of how Pakistani actors’ psychology and conflict perception is shaped by their indigenous 
family dynamics.  
 
This paper has examined that the earliest learning experience of ‘authority and governance’ by 
Pakistanis is acquired from the institution of the family, therefore, people desire that their 
nations/states should function in terms of their idealized family models. Peoples’ beliefs about 
ideal family life serves as a conceptual anchor for their larger moral belief systems and dictate 
their political attitudes about how society and nation should function (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Such metaphorical understanding of the nation-as-family directly informs peoples’ political 
worldview; ‘Directly, but not consciously’ (Lakoff, 1996). To that end, prevailing family 
models in any society – joint-family in Pakistan – produce certain moral systems, which 
influence the actors’ perception about governing a nation, and, functionality of the state. The 
mechanism of linking family dynamics to the state’s actions is a “conceptual metaphor” that 
actors use to reason about abstract concepts in the form of more concrete, daily-based 
knowledge. These metaphors are automatically acquired based on every-day experiences, 
primarily at the early stages of life when basic neural patterns are being formed and 
strengthened in the mind (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). They set up parallels between difficult and 
easy concepts, especially between family dynamics and functioning of the state (Lakoff, 1999).  
Similarly, interstate conflict is a highly abstract concept, therefore, it is conceptualized in 
simpler terms and concrete conflict dealing concepts observed in the family domain. Pakistani 
people as well as political actors use the dynamics of their family conflicts to reason about their 
interstate conflicts, especially with the nation to whom they share a number of commonalities 
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ranging from geographic proximity to identical kinship structures. It is appropriate to mention 
here that the nation, state, politics, governance, group conflict etc. being in the highly abstract 
domains of cognition, have always been reasoned by using conceptual metaphors in 
international relations by the theorists (Lakoff, 1999), for example, states as “animals” 
possessing survival instinct.   
 
As the ‘relations between nations are not essentially different from the relations between 
individuals’ (Morgenthau, 1946, p. 43), therefore, to understand the whole, one must know the 
parts. The interstate relations are relations between individuals on wider scale. Therefore, this 
paper has examined the individual’s behaviour to better understand Pakistan’s behaviour. 
Similarly, the dynamics of the institution of family in Pakistan have been explored to explicate 
the state’s propensities towards taking certain actions, since, to paraphrase Reich (1970, p. 30) 
that ‘state’ after all is a large family. States are hierarchically organized groups of people – full 
of emotions, and, national interest is the highest level of social as well as psychological 
aggregation. Therefore, states cannot ignore popular sentiments regarding aggression while 
formulating their policies (Lebow, 2008). The state’s actions mostly depend upon the 
perception of situation conceptualized by the individual actors responsible for decision-
making, which, in turn, is heavily influenced by their indigenous family dynamics in Pakistan-
India case.  
Sharika theory has used a ‘bottom-up’ approach to systematically analyse psycho-cultural, 
cognitive, and emotional propensities that shape actors’ ideology, belief, perception, and 
policy-making, and, thus, determine the state’s actions and behaviour. It is imperative to 
mention here that Sharika conflict theory explains conflict behaviour not as an individual’s 
belief but as a socially constructed set of ideas about dealing with conflict, developed within 
the ideal family model in Pakistan (and India). As Wendt (1992, p. 398) too has pointed out: it 
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is not individual perceptions, but social structures – or system of the intersubjective norms, 
ideas, beliefs and values that construct identities – and in turn  shapes the interests of the actors.  
 
The conflict theory developed in this paper enables us to conceptualize Pakistan and India as 
estranged cousins (Shariks), and thus throws light on the manners in which they have been 
handling their relationships after partition. It provides us with an additional reference point to 
explain Pakistan’s competitive policies against India. Pakistan always starts from India as its 
central reference point to deal with entire international community. The Sharika theory has the 
potential of applicability to all neighbour states which have culturally similar groups, and who 
were once part of a single society, for example Pakistan-India-Bangladesh, Pashtuns in 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, North-South Korea, Serbia-Croatia-Bosnia etc.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the Pakistan-India partition and their ongoing conflicts from a psycho-
cultural perspective. It provides a theoretical model to compare peoples’ family level conflict 
behaviour to that of national behaviour. The kinship institutions are the most pervasive and 
commanding institutions in both countries, which play a central role in constructing peoples’ 
worldview and conflict behaviour. The paper explains how these conflict behaviours create 
certain moral views effecting peoples’ political behaviour and perception, which is reflected in 
inter-state relations between India and Pakistan. Therefore, after living together for more than 
a millennium both nations have been locked into an intimate rivalry following their indigenous 
conflict behaviour.    
The paper has also examined that people in the subcontinent start from the reference point of 
the ‘joint-family’ to interpret the entire outside world in terms of their kin relations. From 
granting the status of ‘spiritual father’ to their teachers, ‘family-head’ to bosses, and ‘fathers’ 
Page 38 of 43 
 
to political leaders, people in the subcontinent keep on transposing the psycho-cultural 
moralities of kinship-relations into every other institution. Similarly, they also frame their 
enemies in terms of kin rivals. The moralities of conflict dealing learned within their fateful 
kinship institutions are transmuted to other institutions of the state which are said to be 
responsible for policy making 
India and Pakistan can be termed as ‘patient’ states suffering from deep-seated trauma of 
‘separation’ from each other. They are prisoners of ‘I am not respected’ and ‘I am wronged’ 
syndromes respectively. This paper has examined that the collective hysteria existing in both 
nations to hate and compete with each other has cultural origins, characteristics and 
mechanisms (or ‘operating system) emanating from their indigenous culture of conflict at the 
family level. The social institutions, cultural concepts, and cultural artefacts remain in dialectic 
relationship to form the origins and characteristics of multiple psychological phenomena such 
as emotions, maternal love, sexuality, memory, reasoning, anger, perception, development 
process, love or hatred for any country, and mental illness etc. (Ratner, 2012).  
Pakistan denies India’s big-brother role in south Asia because India has not extended proper 
care and nurturance to Pakistan. The conflict between both nations owes more to their cultural 
and historical near-ness and same-ness than their differences. Their rivalry can be best 
understood as: ‘the people who are like us are always extra competitive with  us’. The India-
Pakistan rivalry is of familial nature for being lived side by side for centuries, and, because 
neighbours in the subcontinent are also taken as kin. Despite religious differences both groups 
share many cultural similarities. But it is also true that the most brutal clashes are always among 
the culturally similar groups. 
If we study Pakistani people and its political elite’s behaviour towards India or vice versa, there 
is striking similarity on both sides which exhibit Sharike-Bazi spirit. This paper proposes that 
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Pakistan’s policies against India are not based upon cost-benefit analysis, but their ‘rationality’ 
is guided by their specific culture of conflict. It can explain Pakistani intense competitive drive 
against India, which determines the path for policy makers to use every method to defy Indian 
obvious numerical supremacy. The preservation of prestige and honour against India always 
remains the foremost foreign policy goal for Pakistan. Its huge risks over strategically 
unimportant targets against India, on-and-off use of limited military force, and, the acquisition 
of nuclear capability by a much weaker state like Pakistan can also be explained through 
Sharike-Bazi spirit. It is due to this spirit that Pakistanis believe that their one soldier is equal 
to ten Indian soldiers. 
 
 
Acknowledgement: I am indebted to my parents Ch. Abdul Kadir, Kaneez Fatima & 








a By Biradari (literally brotherhood), I do not mean caste-system or Varna (literally, ‘colour’) in 
Hinduism; the four sweeping social/traditional categories i.e. Brahmin, Ksatryia, Vaisya, and Sudra, 
but it is more akin to the Hindu institution of Jati. The institution of Biradari or Jati is second only to 
the extended family as a pervasive social dimensions of identity; a group of families with a common 
descendant. 
b  https://uddari.wordpress.com/2017/03/25/punjabi-poetry-ustad-daman/, Translated by F. Sharma 
c Translated by the author from Punjabi language 
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